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MIGRATORY AMERICAN DIVORCES-THEIR
INTERNATIONAL STATUS- IS A CENTRAL
REGISTRY PRACTICABLE?
In the course of several years' practice, both at the New York
Bar and at the English Bar, my attention has been from time to
time specially directed to this very important subject, from the fact
that an increasing number of Americans are marrying English
people or other foreigners year by year, and in many cases the
transatlantic spouses have made not only one, but several prior
essays in the matrimonial field. Frequently they have relied on
the advice of some "divorce lawyer" (who so far as accurate
knowledge of legal principles is concerned is often less reliable than
the renowned "sea-lawyer") and have procured an alleged divorce
in some far distant state, upon an alleged domicile, after an alleged
service of process upon the defendant at his or her alleged resi-
dence.
They have been informed that so long as they had sworn at the
time the decree was rendered that they had a "bona-f d e intention"
to become domiciled and had remained for the statutory period in
that State, and so long as the defendant, after being duly served
with process, had failed to appear or had appeared (in pursuance
of a tacit understanding) and the proceedings were otherwise regu-
lar in accordance with the practice in the State in which the action
was brought-they had a "perfectly good divorce, valid the world
over," and could comfortably return to their accustomed pursuits
in their home State.
These proceedings, I am bound to say, have brought discredit
on American administration of justice all over the civilized world,
and have brought untold misery in their train to innocent children
and have been the means of diverting valuable estates into the
hands of those who neither in justice nor morals should ever have
become possessed of them.
I have in mind one especially painful case where a decree was
procured more than twenty-five years ago which was undoubtedly
void ab initio; one of the parties married again and had children
who according to English law, will most certainly be declared
illegitimate. In another case, (at present sub judicie), the title to
YALE LAW JOURNAL
large estates in Scotland is put in grave jeopardy through one of
these fraudulent migratory divorces. It is of little use to argue
that there will always be people who are ready to resort to any
device in order to be separated and to marry another and in many
cases the courts are powerless to prevent it because of the great
difficulties arising from perjured evidence. But at any rate the Bar
and the courts can do something by assiduously prosecuting law-
yers who lend themselves to these fraudulent practises.
So far as the English courts are concerned, I know from
experience, that they- are disposed to administer justice with due
consideration for the judicial systems and procedure of other coun-
tries, but they are entirely indisposed to countenance such frauds
upon the court and the law as are frequently exhibited in these
migratory divorces.
And I think it is of the utmost importance that public attention
should be called as widely as possible to the international aspect
of this matter, so that Americans who contemplate such divorces
should clearly understand the grave risks that they run of having
them declared invalid by any foreign court,-which always has the
power to do so if there is no bona fide "domicile" (as understood
internationally) in the jurisdiction where the decree was rendered.
So far as the English courts are concerned, I cannot too strongly
emphasize the fact that, while they will of course recognize Ameri-
can divorces when duly procured and without fraud, they will
decline to hold valid such divorces where there has been no bona
fide domicile of the plaintiff in the State where the action was
brought and he or she simply resided in such State for the period
required by its laws, and very soon after returned to the real
domicile.
The House of Lords in the comparatively recent case of Earl
Russell (i9oi, Appeal Cases, p. 446), quickly decided that the Earl
was guilty of bigamy, though he had procured a divorce from his
first wife in Nevada (it being held by the Divorce Court in a
previous action that the American court was without jurisdiction
because of the want of a bona fide domicile of the Earl in Nevada),
and they thereupon sentenced him to a term of imprisonment, though
he had been advised by English and American counsel that this
American divorce was valid. That was one of the most interesting
cases of legal procedure imaginable. There was the House of
Lords called upon to try a Peer, one of its own members, on a
charge of bigamy. In accordance with the law of England, Peers
lave the right to call upon the entire Judiciary of England to assist
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the House of Lords in the determination of such legal questions.
The majority of the English judges were present on this occasion,
and there were present also a large proportion of the members of
the House of Lords. There was Earl Russell, a young man in the
prime of life, who had had a most'unfortunate experience with his
wife in England. He took advice there and in the United States.
He went to Nevada and procured a divorce. He then remarried
and came to England, whereupon proceedings for divorce were
taken against him by his first wife. The Divorce Court upon his
default held the American divorce invalid, on the ground, as I have
said, that he had not acquired a bona fide domicile in Nevada. He
had simply gone there for the short time necessary to meet the
requirements of the statutes of that State (which say that he must
"reside" there), had procured his decree and had come away
almost immediately. The Divorce Court said that this did not
constitute a bona fide domicile; a bona fide domicile is the first
requisite for jurisdiction in divorce; his divorce was void, and there-
fore he was guilty of bigamy and adultery. Notwithstanding that
the Earl had procured the best advice he could under the circum-
stances, he had transgressed the statutes of the realm and therefore
was indicted for bigamy. The proceedings being removed to the
House of Lords, that body had the courage (for which I think all
credit is due to them) to send one of their own members to gaol
because he had broken the law, even though it was a mere technical
breach of it brought about by mistaken advice as to a point of foreign
law-it being admitted that he had no criminal intent.
Now I think that if the American courts would exercise the
same firmness and courage in the administration of the law upon
high personages there who attempt to debase the law by deliberately
alleging a domicile which never existed, and perpetrating a fraud
upon the court, the divorce colonies in the States would quickly
dwindle in numbers and in quasi-aristocratic prestige. Many Ameri-
cans are marrying British subjects, and it is now becoming an
exceedingly serious and frequent question in England as to how
far these American divorces shall be recognized. Such divorces are
almost universally looked upon with suspicion; and it ought to be
more generally understood than it is that the English courts can,
and do, whenever American divorces come before them, take fresh
evidence in the courts there to determine whether or not the plaintiff
had in fact a bona fide domicile in the State where the divorce was
granted. The mere recital in the American decree that the plaintiff
was so domiciled is not enough. The English courts determine
that question for themselves independently. The late case of
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Haddock v. Haddock in the United States Supreme Court has
reiterated this as the existing rule on this subject in American law.
I must confess to a fear that jurisdiction of the court in divorce
cases, as a proposition of law, is not sufficiently studied by the
average lawyer who undertakes divorce cases in the United States.
I had my attention called in New York only a short time ago to
the case of a lady who thought it was a very simple and easy matter
to get a divorce. She told her friends that she was going West
to get a divorce. She notified the telephone company in New York
to take her name out of the telephone book, but took great care to
warn her friends that she was at home and could be communicated
with by telephone. She went out to the Western States and engaged
rooms, returned to New York, and in due course of time, after a
sufficient number of days of residence required by the statute had
expired, she again went from New York to that State and came
back with a divorce decree in her hand. All I can say is that if
the validity of that divorce ever comes in question before the English
courts, or before the American courts, it will be declared
absolutely void. The bona fides of the domicile would be gone
into, and it would certainly under those circumstances be
deemed to be fraudulent and not bona fide. Obviously this
litigant's counsel was ignorant or careless of the most ele-
mentary rules governing jurisdiction. This question of juris-
diction in divorce with reference to American decrees has quite
recently come before the English Courts in Armitage v. The Attorney
General [i9o6], Probate Reports, p. 135, and Bater v. Bater, ibid.,
p. 209. In the Armitage case the wife, an English woman, had
married a citizen of New York temporarily residing in England,
who had not abandoned his New York domicile. The wife had
(after her husband had deserted her) gone to South Dakota, aban-
doning her residence in England, and acquired a bona fide domicile
in South Dakota. She there brought action against her husband
for divorce; he appeared in the action, and filed an answer, together
with a counter-claim or cross-petition, claiming divorce from his
wife. The wife secured a divorce and then married a British subject
in Denver, U. S. A., subsequently returned to England with him,
and, at the time of action brought, had been domiciled in England
for several years. In the meantime, her first husband, Gillig, had
married again and described himself in the marriage register as
"the divorced husband of Amy Gillig." After about five years
Gillig petitioned to have his second marriage declared null, alleging
that his first marriage was still subsisting. His first wife, now Mrs.
Armitage, under a special statute (The Legitimacy Declaration Act,
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1858, 21 & 22 Vict. ch. 93), petitioned the English Court for a
declaration of the validity of her second marriage; Gillig was cited
as a party; and the whole question of the validity of the South
Dakota decree was examined in the English proceeding. That is
a most useful statute in England. You will observe that in this
case the first wife married again; the husband had married again,
and he presented a petition to have it declared that his second mar-
riage was null and void, because, as he alleged, the American divorce
decree was invalid. His first wife could not be made a party to
this nullity proceeding under the English practice. Thus it was
found that the husband might have proceeded in the English court
and have procured a declaration that his wife's American divorce
was void, without her appearance at all in that action; but fortu-
nately there is this statute in England which says that any natural
born British subject, whose marriage or legitimacy is questioned,
may petition the English court for a declaration that his marriage
or the marriage of his parents or grandparents was valid, or that
the petitioner was legitimate. This lady therefore petitioned the
court in that case to have her marriage declared valid, and asked
the court to order that the husband's nullity suit follow the trial of
her petition. That was ordered, and on her petition the whole ques-
tion of the validity of the wife's American divorce was gone into,
and it was decided that she had, in fact, acquired a bona fide
domicile, and had abandoned her English domicile (she had taken
great care to establish herself in the United States and live there
for some time and absolutely abandoned her English domicile),
and the English court held that she had, in fact, acquired a bona
fide domicile, and that her divorce was valid, and her second
marriage was valid. This, therefore, settled the whole question,
and the nullity proceeding of the husband was dismissed. This
case illustrates the value of The Legitimacy Declaration Act, and
is further important on this question of jurisdiction.
After very careful consideration, and after hearing the testimony
of experts as to American Law, Sir Gorell Barnes, the President
of the Probate and Divorce Division, decided that as Gillig, the
husband, at the time of the South Dakota decree, still retained his
New York domicile, and had himself filed an answer and counter-
claim to the petition in South Dakota, and since by the law of New
York such proceedings gave the South Dakota court complete
jurisdiction over defendant Gillig (and therefore the courts of New
York were bound to recognize the South Dakota decree as valid),
the English court on grounds of international comity would recog-
nize the South Dakota decree as valid in England. The President
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said:-" The evidence in the present case shows that in the State
of New York the decision of the court of South Dakota would be
recognized as valid. The point then is, Are we in this country to
recognize the validity of a divorce which is recognized as valid by
the law of the domicile? In my view, this question must be answered
in the affirmative. It seems to me impossible to come to any other
conclusion, because the status is affected and determined by the
decree that is recognized in the State of New York-the State of
the domicile as having affected and determined it." The President
also said that this point had not been distinctly determined by the
English Courts in any other case. Thus that court decided that
the South Dakota court had jurisdiction under the special facts to
determine the marital status of a domiciled New Yorker and a
former British subject.
The next case, Bater v. Bater [i9o6], Probate Reports, p. 2o9,
was a still more complicated one. There the English court decided
that the courts of New York had jurisdiction to divorce two British
subjects, the husband having become domiciled in New York. The
case was elaborately argued both in the court below and the court
of Appeal. The facts were that the husband and wife separated in
England, each claiming a cause of divorce against the other, and
that both were at fault. This was a very curious case, because, the
husband having left her in England, the wife, according to American
law, would, if innocent, have the right to acquire a separate domicile.
The husband came to America and took out his first papers pre-
paratory to becoming a naturalized citizen, and settled in Brooklyn.
The wife came to New York and resided there. She brought action
for divorce there, and he failed to appear. She got her decree,
married a British subject in New York, and returned to England
with her second husband. They subsequently separated, and ten
years afterwards the second husband brought an action in England
to have his marriage declared null, on the ground that his wife's
first husband was alive. She set up the New York decree of divorce
in bar, and the whole question of the jurisdiction of the New York
courts was thoroughly examined. The English court took this
ground, that, while by English law the domicile of the wife is
at the domicile of the husband (and though the fact was, by Ameri-
can law, he having given her cause for divorce, she could acquire
a separate domicile if she chose), nevertheless she had the right to
elect, if she saw fit, to adopt the domicile of her husband in New
York as her domicile. He being at fault, the court said there is
nothing in international law, and nothing on general principle which
will forbid the wife in such a case saying that, while the American
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rule is a valuable rule, it is a rule adopted for the benefit of the
wife, and not to her detriment-that for the purpose of the action
for divorce the wife had the right to go to the domicile of her
husband and bring her action for divorce there. There was no case
in the courts of New York exactly in point, and the President of
the Probate and Divorce Division said he could see no reason why
those principles should not be applied; and held the divorce valid
and dismissed the nullity suit. The case went to the Court of
Appeal, and there the decision was affirmed. The President said
(p. 215):-"I feel that one is presented with a serious difficulty,
because one has, so to speak, to place one's self in the same position
as a judge in the State of New York would be in if this point was
raised before him-in other words, to ascertain, through him, what
is the rule he would apply in deciding this case." Referring to
sections 1,756 and 1,768 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in discussing
the question as to whether or not the wife, being separated from
the husband, and in fact resident in another country up to within
a short time of moving to New York, could bring her action for
divorce there, he said there was nothing to prevent the New York
court from saying (p. 216) :-"If you have come to our court and
your husband is domiciled here, we will, apart from our statutory dif-
ficulties, give you relief. Then, supposing that case is presented to
the court in New York, the court would very naturally say, apart
from being tied by the section, your husband is domiciled here: his
home is here, and prima facie yours is here, You have come here
to pursue him and obtain your remedy. Why should that remedy
be withheld, because if you succeed you propose to return to your
own country? I should have thought myself, as a matter of justice,
expediency and convenience, it was very proper to allow a suit to
be entertained in a foreign country in these circumstances, and I
cannot help feeling that considerations of that character would weigh
very considerably with a judge in the State of New Ytork in
deciding whether under such a term as the term 'resident' he was
to exclude the petitioner from her right to maintain a suit. .....
I have come to the conclusion that this suit could have been main-
tained in the State of New York." The President held that,
although the divorce was for a cause which would be insufficient
for a decree in England, it would be held valid there because valid
in New York (the place of the husband's domicile). He further
said:-" If this country recognizes the right of a foreign tribunal
to dissolve a marriage of two persons who were at the time domiciled
in that foreign country, it must also recognize that their marriage
may be dissolved according to the law of that foreign country even
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though that law would dissolve a marriage for a lesser cause than
would dissolve it in this country." Referring to fraudulent divorces
he said that:-" Where the parties have gone to the foreign country
and were not truly domiciled there, and represented that they were
domiciled there and so had induced the court to grant a decree, the
collusion or fraud in those cases goes to the root of the jurisdiction.
There is no jurisdiction if there is no domicile."
Then affirming the decision of the President of the Probate and
Divorce Division, the Court of Appeals said (Collins, M. R.) p.
225, as to a decree of divorce that it is a judgment that "is really
indistinguishable from a judgment in rem. Some of the judges
seem to have considered that for some reason it is not an absolute
judgment in rem, but for all purposes it is on the same footing; that
is to say, it is a judgment affecting the status of the" parties. If
it is a judgment in rem or stands on the saine footing, as I think
it undoubtedly does, can it be impeached in proceedings taken in
this country by a person not a party to that judgment at all? ....
There is clear authority in our courts that that cannot be done."
He further said (p. 232) :-"The law now unquestionably
stands in this position. The court of the existing bona fide
domicile for the time being of the married pair has jurisdiction
over persons originally domiciled in another country to undo a mar-
riage solemnized in that other country."
Then Lord Justice Romer, in taking up this question of the
separate domicile of the wife, said very clearly (p. 233) :-" Now
the question arises, Was the wife dwelling in the State at the time
she brought this action? Undoubtedly, according to the law of the
State, the wife, in the. circumstances which happened here, could
have had a separate domicile from that of the husband, but I take
it that the wife inight have exercised her option, and that she was
quite entitled, if she chose, to say that her domicile still remained
the domicile of her husband as assumed by him, that is to say,
domiciled in New York State, and I think that by going, as she
did, to dwell in the State for the purpose of bringing the action for
divorce, and then bringing that action, it must be taken that she
had elected to make that domicile, at any rate for the purposes of
the action, the domicile of her husband in New York State; and I
cannot see that there is any good reason why the wife, if she chose
so to elect her domicile, should not have elected to take that domicile
for the purposes of the divorce if she could obtain it. Moreover,
taking the expert evidence as a whole, I come to the same con-
clusion as that arrived at by the learned President, namely, that
the wife had, according to the law of the State of New York, when
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she brought this action, a residence there within the meaning of
the word as used in the code governing the law in the State of New
York. The result is that, dealing with the question of jurisdiction
from the point of view of the law of the State of New York, the
court had jurisdiction to entertain the action. Then how does the
matter stand from the point of view of the English law? I have
already stated that, on the facts the husband had changed his
domicile, and had acquired a domicile in the State of New York.
According to the English law until divorce the wife's domicile
would be that of the husband or, at any rate, might be that of the
husband if she chose, to the extent of her electing to regard the
changed domicile of the husband as her domicile; and there is no
reason, according to English law, why she should not be at liberty,
if she chose, to go abroad to the State of New York, electing for
the purposes of the divorce proceedings her domicile to be that of
the husband and suing him there; and, according to English law,
I take it that, at the time of action brought and divorce granted
there, the domicile of both the husband and the wife was the domi-
cile of the State in which the court in which the action was brought
was situated, so that the court there had ample jurisdiction accord-
ing to English law. Therefore, in whichever way the matter is
regarded, it seems to me clear that the court granting this divorce
had jurisdiction."
[Lord Justice Cozens Hardy said (p. 238) the wife "by her
conduct manifested her election to treat herself as not having a
separate domicile, but as following her husband's domicile in New
York. This being so, it is now settled by authority which binds us
that the court of the country in which the parties were domiciled-
that is to say, New York-was the court having jurisdiction to
decree a divorce, even though the divorce was granted for a ground
which would not be sufficient in England" Harvey v. Farnie,
8 App. Cases 43; Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier [1895] A. C. 517.]
Those are the two leading cases decided recently in England on
this subject of jurisdiction in divorce, and I wish to summarize the
points that have been decided by the English courts on the ques-
tion, not including, of course, all the points on which the English
courts would recognize these American migratory decrees. The
English courts will recognize an American divorce, assuming the
proceedings to be regularly conducted in accordance with the law
of the State whose court grants the decree :-
(i) Where the parties are British subjects and the divorce is
granted by the courts of the State in which the husband and wife
are bona fide domiciled. The wife for the purpose of divorce may
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elect to sue the husband at his domicile, even though by American
law she might perhaps be entitled to acquire a separate legal domicile
from his. Bater v. Bater.
(2) Where an English woman is married to an American citizen,
and the divorce is gratnted by the courts of the State where the
wife is domiciled, and the State where the husband is domiciled
would recognize such divorce as valid. Armitage v. The Attorney
General. [In that case the husband was domiciled in New York,
and he appeared in his wife's South Dakota action and filed a cross-
petition. The court then, of course, had jurisdiction over both
parties and of the whole subject-matter, the wife (plaintiff) having
a bona ide domicile there].
(3) Where the husband and wife are American citizens and
the divorce is granted by the courts of the State where the plaintiff
is domiciled and the defendant was served with process within the
State where the action was brought or appeared in the action, even
though for a cause not recognized in England as sufficient-this on
principles of comity because such a divorce would be recognized as
valid throughout the United States of America. Armitage v. The
Attorney General; Bater v. Bater; Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S.,
Supreme Court Reports, p. 562.
So much for the substantive law as to jurisdiction, but the matter
of procedure is only next in importance to it, and in this connection
I desire to offer a few suggestions, which I think may help toward
a practical solution of some serious difficulties.
In England we get such cases as this. A wife has been informed
that her husband is getting a divorce against her in the United States
by default. She does not know where to apply and asks where can
we ascertain whether such action is being brought? It is abso-
lutely impossible to find out unless you search the court records
of every county in the United States. Then sometimes a man comes
home to England and tells his wife: "You are divorced; there is
the decree." The wife has heard nothing at all about it. Perhaps
the husband will marry again and have children, and the question
will arise as to the legitimacy of those children, and as to their right
to inherit real estate, because by English law it is quite impossible
to inherit English real property unless the person to inherit is legiti-
mate according to the law of England. I suggest, therefore, the
following as partial remedies for these difficulties:-
(i) That all matrimonial decrees (divorce, nullity, or separa-
tion) should be recorded, not only in the office of the clerk of the
county where the judgment was rendered, but also in the office of
the secretary of state of the State in which such county is situated;
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and that it is also desirable that a copy of the complaint and the
summons or writ should be filed in such secretary of state's office
immediately after service. (2) All such matrimonial actions should
be under the supervision of the attorney-general of the State and
his assistants, who would be able to intervene in cases of fraud, in
much the same way that the king's proctor in England may inter-
vene, and of his own motion take steps to prevent the decree nisi
being made final in the States where decrees nisi are granted. It
would also be well if he had power to ascertain whether the necessary
jurisdictional facts (e. g., bona fide domicile) existed before allow-
ing the action to proceed. (3) The creation at Washington, or
some central place, of a central registry for the recording of all
such matrimonial decrees throughout the United States-to be done
at the expense of the several States agreeing to use such registry.
As these three points are entirely on matters of procedure, it is
competent for the several States each to pass a statute providing
that the matrimonial decrees of that State shall not be deemed
final and operative unless and until a copy of the complaint and
summons or writ has been filed in the office of the secretary of
state of that State, and likewise a copy of the decree, and unless
the attorney-general has been properly cited. There can be no
constitutional objection to such a course, for if by statute of the
State in which the decrees were rendered it would not be deemed
a valid final decree until recorded as above stated, no other State
would under the Constitution be obliged to give it "full faith and
credit" unless so recorded. Each State can regulate its own pro-
cedure, and no judgment is a valid final judgment unless entered
in accordance with such procedure.
Any such central registry will, of course, not be easy of accom-
plishment, but none the less I think some constitutional method of
creating it could be devised. We ought to get rid of the notion
in the United States, that because of our constitutional system
nothing can be done as is done in other countries. By a search
in one office in London, all matrimonial decrees affecting forty
millions of English people can be searched in a short time. The
same is true of both Scotland and Ireland by a search in Edinburgh
and Dublin. Why cannot there be (in time) one such office in the
United States?
There is the further very serious question, which is rarely
touched upon with reference to divorce decrees, viz., their effect
upon titles to real estate and inheritance. As matters now stand in
the United States, Mr. A. on selling his real estate may offer a
deed purporting to be signed by Mrs. A., who may or may not be,
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in law, his wife. If he has been divorced he will perhaps offer a
divorce decree which may turn out to be regular, but he may at the
same time conceal the fact that he was the defendant in prior divorce
proceedings in which a decree was rendered, which for lack of
jurisdiction is void, leaving him still married to his former spouse.
At present there is no earthly practicable way of searching for
such decrees throughout the United States. Again, Mr. B. dies
leaving children who claim to inherit his estate. It may be that
he was the defendant in some bogus divorce suit in a far away State,
subsequently married again, and that these children are not entitled
to inherit at all. Such registries would greatly facilitate search, and
the fact that they existed would help to diminish the number of
these secret divorces.
Of course States which make a bid for divorce business cannot
be expected to spoil their business by agreeing to any such registries,
but anything that can be done by legislation throughout the United
States to lessen the number of places in which it is necessary to
search is an immense gain, for it would facilitate the reopening of
fraudulent divorce decrees by innocent persons before it is too late,
would tend to settle titles to real estate, and to put the United States
more on a par with the judicial systems of other countries.
I am aware, of course, that such central registry must be sup-
ported by voluntary action of the several States desiring to use it,
and at their expense, and that it will not be a matter of federal
regulation at all. There are also other difficulties and objections in
the way, but I see none that are insuperable. Moreover, is it not
time that there should also be a central registry for births, marriages,
and deaths throughout the United States ? At the present time it
is practically an impossible task to ascertain the place of birth, mar-
riage or death of any one whose descendants may be entitled to
foreign real estate, unless his foreign relatives know where he settled
or lived, which very frequently they do not. It is easier in States
where these records are duplicated in the secretary of state's office;
but in many of them there are no such duplicate records, and so
those of each county or city must be searched. Such a registry in
time would probably be partly if not wholly self-supporting, and the
initial expense of it would be very small when divided amongst
several States.
I think also, on the lines of my former suggestions, that there
ought to be a statute passed in every State, (as I believe there is
in some States), similar to the "Legitimacy Declaration Act" in
England, by which when anyone's marriage or divorce is questioned,
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he or she can petition the court for a determination of the validity
or non-validity of the marriage or the divorce. As I pointed out
in the case of Armitage v. The Attorney-General, the wife was
able to stop the nullity proceeding of her first husband (to which
she could not be made a party) and get a declaration saying that
her American divorce was valid. I think if that suggestion were
adopted it would avoid many great difficulties. The Attorney Gen-
eral should be cited to prevent fraud, as in England.
And finally, as it is the duty of all lawyers to do their part in
ameliorating the condition of mankind in every rational way, I
trust that both in the United States and in England they and all
others who have the welfare of society at heart will direct public
attention to this subject and endeavor to procure the passage of
uniform divorce laws. The recent Divorce Congress in Washington
and Philadelphia has done a great international service in this direc-
tion already, and will doubtless do still more. The judges can
also be depended upon to do their part in bringing about some
uniformity in judicial 'decisions on this subject. In time, therefore,
I trust we shall be able to advise our clients that a divorce rendered
in the United States will be recognized in England, and a divorce
rendered in England of American citizens domiciled there will be
recognized in the United States, and thus possibly some day there
will be an end to the legislative and judicial chaos in which at
present the divorce laws of the United States seem almost hopelessly
involved.
. Arthur Barratt.
London.
